In order to see whether or not there is a conflict between Divine omniscience and exercise of free will (whether it be Divine or human) we must clarify how we define either terms. The matter at hand is the definition of omniscience and problems that arise depending on how we look at the term. The simplistic understanding of the term is the ability to know everything. According to other aspects of God based on classical theism, I would argue that if God is capable of knowing everything, he ought to know everything since he is perfectly good. This may not be true if we are talking about morally neutral matters but when it comes to matters that affect humans, it seems morally insufficient that God should turn a blind eye to what is going to happen or any human related affairs. One may argue that God does not have a moral obligation to know everything concerning the future and God has a morally sufficient reason to provide us with complete free will without him knowing. However, Christianity, at the least, seems to suggest otherwise in many cases. For example, one of the most well known occurrence of this is during Christ’s last supper when he points out that Judas will betray him and Peter will deny Christ three times before the next morning. These prophecies have a direct effect on human free will as he mentions them to the ones that fulfill these prophecies. Both of them have differing opinions on what is said but both are fulfilled, according to the scripture. One may argue that Judas was finally pushed over the edge at this accusation and we can see how Judas calls Jesus a "Rabbi" (Matthew 26:25) when confronted in contrast to the other apostles who call Jesus "Lord". Whether or not Judas would've betrayed Jesus that night if Jesus had not made that prophecy is unanswerable and somewhat irrelevant. Jesus points out the inevitable betrayal while telling the person he will do so, and it is fulfilled regardless. On the other hand, Peter, just before Jesus foretells Peter's denials, proclaims, "Lord, I am ready to go with you both to prison and to death." Peter, in this case, heard the prophecy after and most probably made a conscious effort to note the immediate dilemma he may face and make sure that he doesn't deny Christ once, let alone three times. This seems to suggest that God, at least knows (or is capable of knowing at any given time) the decisions that humans will make and the question boils down to whether this puts the exercise of human free will possible. One way to look at it is through soft determinism where God knows what we will do tomorrow: God is simply aware of our decisions and perhaps can influence our decisions but that is for another time and another topic. I would argue that this does not directly conflict with human free will as long as humans are the ones making these decisions.
Thursday, 27 October 2011
Omniscience and Free will - is there a conflict?
If God is an omniscient being, and he is aware of what will happen and what decisions we as humans will make, do we have free will? Also, if God knows all, does he know what decisions he will make? Does Divine omniscience conflict with the exercise of human free will? Is the supposed omniscience of God in conflict with the Divine exercise of free will?
In order to see whether or not there is a conflict between Divine omniscience and exercise of free will (whether it be Divine or human) we must clarify how we define either terms. The matter at hand is the definition of omniscience and problems that arise depending on how we look at the term. The simplistic understanding of the term is the ability to know everything. According to other aspects of God based on classical theism, I would argue that if God is capable of knowing everything, he ought to know everything since he is perfectly good. This may not be true if we are talking about morally neutral matters but when it comes to matters that affect humans, it seems morally insufficient that God should turn a blind eye to what is going to happen or any human related affairs. One may argue that God does not have a moral obligation to know everything concerning the future and God has a morally sufficient reason to provide us with complete free will without him knowing. However, Christianity, at the least, seems to suggest otherwise in many cases. For example, one of the most well known occurrence of this is during Christ’s last supper when he points out that Judas will betray him and Peter will deny Christ three times before the next morning. These prophecies have a direct effect on human free will as he mentions them to the ones that fulfill these prophecies. Both of them have differing opinions on what is said but both are fulfilled, according to the scripture. One may argue that Judas was finally pushed over the edge at this accusation and we can see how Judas calls Jesus a "Rabbi" (Matthew 26:25) when confronted in contrast to the other apostles who call Jesus "Lord". Whether or not Judas would've betrayed Jesus that night if Jesus had not made that prophecy is unanswerable and somewhat irrelevant. Jesus points out the inevitable betrayal while telling the person he will do so, and it is fulfilled regardless. On the other hand, Peter, just before Jesus foretells Peter's denials, proclaims, "Lord, I am ready to go with you both to prison and to death." Peter, in this case, heard the prophecy after and most probably made a conscious effort to note the immediate dilemma he may face and make sure that he doesn't deny Christ once, let alone three times. This seems to suggest that God, at least knows (or is capable of knowing at any given time) the decisions that humans will make and the question boils down to whether this puts the exercise of human free will possible. One way to look at it is through soft determinism where God knows what we will do tomorrow: God is simply aware of our decisions and perhaps can influence our decisions but that is for another time and another topic. I would argue that this does not directly conflict with human free will as long as humans are the ones making these decisions.
Now, concerning Divine exercise in free will and its conflict with Divine omniscience, this poses more difficulty in answering with a degree of certainty. In accordance with the other natures understood in classical theism, I would postulate that there is no reason for God to make “decisions” as he is aware of all knowledge that transcends the time boundaries of this universe. God is perfectly good so the moral dilemmas do not exist also. God can interact with us in decision-making manner but he was aware of our reactions before conversing with us and hence already knew the outcome before engaging with us. I would argue that it is a contradiction to label God’s action in the same way that we define free will – God does what he wills but there is no need to make decisions to do what he wills.
In order to see whether or not there is a conflict between Divine omniscience and exercise of free will (whether it be Divine or human) we must clarify how we define either terms. The matter at hand is the definition of omniscience and problems that arise depending on how we look at the term. The simplistic understanding of the term is the ability to know everything. According to other aspects of God based on classical theism, I would argue that if God is capable of knowing everything, he ought to know everything since he is perfectly good. This may not be true if we are talking about morally neutral matters but when it comes to matters that affect humans, it seems morally insufficient that God should turn a blind eye to what is going to happen or any human related affairs. One may argue that God does not have a moral obligation to know everything concerning the future and God has a morally sufficient reason to provide us with complete free will without him knowing. However, Christianity, at the least, seems to suggest otherwise in many cases. For example, one of the most well known occurrence of this is during Christ’s last supper when he points out that Judas will betray him and Peter will deny Christ three times before the next morning. These prophecies have a direct effect on human free will as he mentions them to the ones that fulfill these prophecies. Both of them have differing opinions on what is said but both are fulfilled, according to the scripture. One may argue that Judas was finally pushed over the edge at this accusation and we can see how Judas calls Jesus a "Rabbi" (Matthew 26:25) when confronted in contrast to the other apostles who call Jesus "Lord". Whether or not Judas would've betrayed Jesus that night if Jesus had not made that prophecy is unanswerable and somewhat irrelevant. Jesus points out the inevitable betrayal while telling the person he will do so, and it is fulfilled regardless. On the other hand, Peter, just before Jesus foretells Peter's denials, proclaims, "Lord, I am ready to go with you both to prison and to death." Peter, in this case, heard the prophecy after and most probably made a conscious effort to note the immediate dilemma he may face and make sure that he doesn't deny Christ once, let alone three times. This seems to suggest that God, at least knows (or is capable of knowing at any given time) the decisions that humans will make and the question boils down to whether this puts the exercise of human free will possible. One way to look at it is through soft determinism where God knows what we will do tomorrow: God is simply aware of our decisions and perhaps can influence our decisions but that is for another time and another topic. I would argue that this does not directly conflict with human free will as long as humans are the ones making these decisions.
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