Uncertainty of Science: In Regards to David Hume

In the previous post, I went into epistemological basis for where knowledge comes from and how our mind is formed.  I intentionally left out the major views on what mind is to keep the focus on epistemology but I do want to continue talking about how knowledge is gained and what we are able to gain from observational data: through inductive reasoning.  The below is part of a debate I had with a friend named Lance.  I've edited it so as to not be aggressively pointing fingers at the reader.

I would first like to source David Hume, who seems to have the ever looming presence in the world of science as he posed the question on the falsity of the belief we hold to be certain regarding observational studies, science. Although this wasn't his goal (similar to how Descartes wasn't trying to make people fall into solipsism), he doesn't successfully work his way out of this conclusion.  He proposes that we believe in the concept of causality (there is a cause and effect, or everything has a cause) out of habit and it is not a deductively held argument. It's a rather intuitive and seemingly true since if we see a chair on fire, we immediately assume something must have set it off and we often look for he cause.  However, Hume begs to differ.  Let’s say we put our hand above a fire and we feel pain. We seem to think that this gives us solid grounds to think fire causes pain and will cause pain in the future if we put our hand on it again. However, what are the hidden premises to support these suppositions? It is the premise that there is a causal relationship between the two: hand over fire and pain. It is also the supposition that the future will be like the past. However, that is not a deductive inference. For example, a newborn human mind, let’s say if Adam was possible, could not have reasoned his way, deductively to think that a source of warmth and light would consume him if he put his hand on it. He could not deductively reason his way to think that water he drinks for nourishment would drown him if he cannot get out of it. We know these to be true because we’ve experienced it. Hume calls these “matters of fact” and separates it from “relations of ideas” which goes something like, “all unmarried men are bachelors” or 5x2=10. Relations of ideas can be demonstrated using empirical arguments and are conceptually and by definition true. However, Hume goes on to argue that “every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause”. A deductive argument presents premises and can lead us to the conclusion based on it, however, science is not of this nature.

Of Knowledge - Sensation, Mind and Existence

While struggling with the ideas presented by René Descartes (1596-1650), John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753) and Bertrand Russel (1872-1970), many notions came and went in my mind.  This only made me want to delve further into what knowledge truly is and study the nature of mind.  What is mind?  Is there knowledge and if so, what is it?  These thoughts all started with my natural (and religious) inclination to prove objective realism but in the end, that proved to be more challenging and perhaps an impossible endeavor.  I wish to jot down my thoughts that are developing in my mind so that I can continuously reflect upon it, develop it, or perhaps come to a point of total rejection of the thoughts presented below.  I do not wish to convey that I am at a loss as these are what I believe to be certain at the moment but I only wish to accept that I’ve arrived at these thoughts recently and in a recent future, I may arrive at another. 

In consideration of René Descartes’ Meditations, there seems to be some problems with where he heads with scepticism and even where he begins.  Indeed, it was surprising to see Descartes write about the existence of God right after he explains his reason for sceptical thinking in his Meditations.  I can see that he implements an ontological argument similar to St. Anselm’s in this case but where he moves from doubting all obtained knowledge to any notion related to God seems problematic.  Any conventional concept of God, and especially the God of classical theism, must be taught and must be a knowledge obtained through teachings.  After establishing that all these knowledge can be doubted, one cannot talk about ideas in his mind being the proof of existence of God.

Omniscience and Free will - is there a conflict?

If God is an omniscient being, and he is aware of what will happen and what decisions we as humans will make, do we have free will?  Also, if God knows all, does he know what decisions he will make?  Does Divine omniscience conflict with the exercise of human free will? Is the supposed omniscience of God in conflict with the Divine exercise of free will?

In order to see whether or not there is a conflict between Divine omniscience and exercise of free will (whether it be Divine or human) we must clarify how we define either terms. The matter at hand is the definition of omniscience and problems that arise depending on how we look at the term. The simplistic understanding of the term is the ability to know everything. According to other aspects of God based on classical theism, I would argue that if God is capable of knowing everything, he ought to know everything since he is perfectly good. This may not be true if we are talking about morally neutral matters but when it comes to matters that affect humans, it seems morally insufficient that God should turn a blind eye to what is going to happen or any human related affairs. One may argue that God does not have a moral obligation to know everything concerning the future and God has a morally sufficient reason to provide us with complete free will without him knowing. However, Christianity, at the least, seems to suggest otherwise in many cases. For example, one of the most well known occurrence of this is during Christ’s last supper when he points out that Judas will betray him and Peter will deny Christ three times before the next morning. These prophecies have a direct effect on human free will as he mentions them to the ones that fulfill these prophecies. Both of them have differing opinions on what is said but both are fulfilled, according to the scripture.  One may argue that Judas was finally pushed over the edge at this accusation and we can see how Judas calls Jesus a "Rabbi" (Matthew 26:25) when confronted in contrast to the other apostles who call Jesus "Lord".  Whether or not Judas would've betrayed Jesus that night if Jesus had not made that prophecy is unanswerable and somewhat irrelevant.  Jesus points out the inevitable betrayal while telling the person he will do so, and it is fulfilled regardless.  On the other hand, Peter, just before Jesus foretells Peter's denials, proclaims, "Lord, I am ready to go with you both to prison and to death."  Peter, in this case, heard the prophecy after and most probably made a conscious effort to note the immediate dilemma he may face and make sure that he doesn't deny Christ once, let alone three times.  This seems to suggest that God, at least knows (or is capable of knowing at any given time) the decisions that humans will make and the question boils down to whether this puts the exercise of human free will possible. One way to look at it is through soft determinism where God knows what we will do tomorrow: God is simply aware of our decisions and perhaps can influence our decisions but that is for another time and another topic. I would argue that this does not directly conflict with human free will as long as humans are the ones making these decisions.

Now, concerning Divine exercise in free will and its conflict with Divine omniscience, this poses more difficulty in answering with a degree of certainty. In accordance with the other natures understood in classical theism, I would postulate that there is no reason for God to make “decisions” as he is aware of all knowledge that transcends the time boundaries of this universe. God is perfectly good so the moral dilemmas do not exist also. God can interact with us in decision-making manner but he was aware of our reactions before conversing with us and hence already knew the outcome before engaging with us. I would argue that it is a contradiction to label God’s action in the same way that we define free will – God does what he wills but there is no need to make decisions to do what he wills.

Is there a fallacy in the statement that starts with - If there is a God...

Many questions arise when studying philosophy of religion: mainly that of problems and inquiries from atheists questioning the principles of God and His existence. I was reading Descartes' "Meditations" and came across the following in the preface: "Thus all that atheists allege will give us no difficulty if only we remind ourselves that we should consider our minds to be finite and limited, and God to be an infinite and incomprehensible being."

Now, discarding any negative connotation concerning "atheists" back then and applying that statement to the more up-to-date definition of atheists, it seems there are certain contradictions when discussing the nature of God.  This became more apparent as I reflected upon the last blog regarding Mackie's article on problem of evil: "if there is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God, why does evil exist?"

The problem in its simplest form is this: The inquiry above can be re-written as "if there is [a being who is infinite and is impossible for a finite being like ourselves to exhaustively understand him], why does [an aspect of the world or an aspect of God contradict with my understanding of this world or god?]  Indeed, if we were able to understand God completely, we would be gods.  It is also why many theologians will tend to include the fact that we are unable to completely understand god in most of their responses to the questions thrown at them.

Our minds have their limits and this world has limits and boundaries that we are unable to surpass.  Many questions are left unanswered and have baffled the brightest of mankind for a long time.  It seems that as we strive to solve this puzzle that is this world, humans tend to become more arrogant.  Instead of becoming more humble, as answers to these questions tend to sprout more questions, we claim that we have found enough answers to disregard God as an option: that it is irrational and unreasonable to believe in a being greater than this universe.

Now, keep in mind that our strive and pursuit of knowledge is a healthy one and must be pursued by man (when I said/say man, it is not gender specific) born to do so.  We must continue on this journey of science whether it be theoretical physics or evolutionary biology.  As a Christian, I am thrilled to know how this world works and how it is so intricately woven together.  I had trouble grasping the concept that this world is imperfect (Theodicy, Gottfried Leibniz); imperfect for whom?  Of course, Leibniz meant that there were flaws present in this world but just like love - man and woman both have flaws but there are couples who are perfect together.

God is a being who reason alone can never seem to approach.  Does this mean that we can dismiss almost all claims and arguments against God?  Perhaps, but we shouldn't: it is true that many of the answers we provide may ultimately spiral down to the answer that "we are unable to gauge the depth of God", but this seems highly dogmatic.  Most of these questions are important and they must be addressed by those on either side of the fence (religious/non-religious).  As we must pursue a higher understanding of the universe through science, we must continue to pursue a higher understanding beyond science; perhaps some day those two will converge.

Problem of Evil: Can God be Perfectly Good and Omnipotent?

John Leslie Mackie from his article “Evil and Omnipotence” (1955) points out that certain traditional theistic views are in themselves fallacious and “that the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another”. His views are as follows:

The problem of evil, in the sense in which I shall be using the phrase, is a problem only for someone who believes that there is a God who is both omnipotent and wholly good… In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true and third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions.

Mackie goes on to address the counter-arguments given by theists and although we will briefly take a look at those as I would like to be thorough in examining Mackie’s stance, I would like to try to explain how the main principles of theism can be non-contradictory by themselves in reflection to Christian scriptures and general teachings. This means that I will be dismissing the arguments in a similar fashion that Mackie dismisses these claims.

Greetings!

Welcome to my blog.

As I study Philosophy, I wanted to get a blog going to jot down my thoughts, tackle polemical issues on ethics and discuss other aspects of Philosophy.  I will try to exercise modesty in my thoughts as it is pointless to learn or rather it is impossible to learn without academic modesty.  It is also my intention to try and represent both sides of an argument to make sure all grounds are covered but at the end of the day, I will admit here and now, it is very easy for my bias to impede certain arguments.

I hope to hear your thoughts on these issues on the comments.